The G20 Johannesburg Summit arrived with big promises: a historic first for Africa, a crowded agenda, and a chance for the Global South to shape global priorities. Yet as leaders met in Johannesburg, the question hung in the air: how much do these summits actually change on the ground?
A Summit Built on High Expectations
Held on 22–23 November 2025 in Johannesburg’s Nasrec Expo Centre, the meeting gathered delegations from all G20 members, though not every top leader showed up. South Africa led the summit under the banner “Solidarity, Equality, Sustainability.” It was an ambitious theme, and one that reflected the hopes of countries long calling for a fairer global system.
Unlike previous meetings dominated by trade disputes or security tensions, the Johannesburg agenda leaned heavily toward structural issues that developing nations face every day. Food security, climate finance, disaster readiness, debt pressures, and fair access to mineral supply chains filled the discussion rooms. In several sessions, African leaders openly questioned why the global financial system still runs on rules that were written decades ago—and rarely written with them in mind.
What the Summit Produced, and What It Didn’t
The meeting ended with a long Leaders’ Declaration, packed with commitments on food systems, climate resilience, debt transparency, and reforms to international financial institutions. Indonesia backed these points, especially the call for more predictable climate financing and stronger early-warning systems for disasters.
But one area stood out: debt-relief mechanisms, including voluntary debt-for-climate swaps.
This idea has circulated for years, but the Johannesburg debate gave it sharper edges. Several African and Asian countries—Indonesia included—face rising costs from climate events while still carrying old debt burdens. Swaps could, in theory, free up funds for green transitions. The difficulty is that they rely on voluntary participation from creditors, whose enthusiasm often runs cold once negotiations begin.
Still, the fact that the G20 put this issue near the top suggests growing recognition that climate vulnerability and financial instability are becoming a single problem. Whether this turns into concrete deals remains to be seen.
The Fractures Behind the Applause
For all the hopeful language, the summit displayed real cracks. The United States held back in several sessions and later announced that South Africa would not be invited to the 2026 G20 Summit in Florida. Officially, Washington framed it as frustration over what it called “procedural irregularities” in the handover of the G20 presidency. But behind that diplomatic phrasing lies a complex mix of grievances.
South Africa’s foreign policy has increasingly leaned toward a Global South alignment that sometimes puts it at odds with Washington—particularly on Middle East diplomacy, certain UN votes, and its criticism of Western-dominated financial institutions. The Biden administration had tolerated these tensions; the current U.S. administration is choosing a more confrontational line. The decision not to invite a sitting G20 member is rare and could set a precedent that weakens the forum’s core idea: that even rivals sit at the same table.
Indonesia’s View: Opportunity, Risk, and a Test of the G20’s Future
Jakarta arrived in Johannesburg with clear objectives. Indonesia wanted climate financing that works for developing economies, support for sustainable industrialization, and recognition of Southeast Asia’s growing economic role. On those fronts, the summit delivered modest progress.
Indonesia also paid close attention to the debate on critical minerals. With major nickel and cobalt reserves, Indonesia is trying to move beyond exporting raw ore and toward building higher-value industries at home. The summit’s call for fairer mineral supply chains supports that direction.
But Indonesia also sees the risks. If the G20 becomes another arena fractured by great-power rivalry, the space for countries like Indonesia to push development agendas may shrink. Jakarta depends on a functioning multilateral system, flawed as it is, because the alternatives are far less favorable for middle-income economies trying to climb the value chain.
